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WORLDWIDE RELIANCE: IS IT ENOUGH? THE
IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND




Advancements in technology allow people and companies to do
business in places they have never physically been.  The evolution of
personal jurisdiction as a constitutional limitation on federal courts
has tracked these advancements in technology.1  Courts must balance
an individual state’s ability to assert jurisdiction against the due pro-
cess rights of defendants.2  The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments are among the most debated constitutional
amendments.3  International white collar cases prosecuted by the fed-
eral government are subject to many constitutional limitations, most
notably the Due Process Clause.4
Due process of law is a fundamental, constitutional guarantee that
all legal proceedings will be fair, and that one will be given notice of
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard before the govern-
ment acts to take away one’s life, liberty, or property.5  The Constitu-
tion also guarantees that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious, and that the legal means shall have a real and substantial
1. Lief Swedlow, Three Paradigms of Presence: A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the
Internet, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 337, 341 (1997).
2. Id. at 342.
3. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 408
(2011).
4. Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Prosecutorial Limitations in Cross-Border Investi-
gations, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/00075/_res/id=At
tachments/index=0/
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
139
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-1\DPL103.txt unknown Seq: 2  5-JAN-18 15:16
140 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:139
relation to the object sought to be obtained.6  Due process in the civil
context also requires that a defendant not present within the territory
of the forum have certain “minimum contacts” with the forum state so
that the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.”7
The Due Process Clause is the sole limitation on a state’s power to
subject an out-of-state defendant to the personal jurisdiction of its
courts,8 and applies to both domestic and foreign defendants.9  How-
ever, foreign defendants are not always protected by due process in
United States courts.  Despite the usual presumption against extrater-
ritorial application of United States laws, federal courts often assert
jurisdiction over foreign defendants.10  As a result of the recent in-
crease in the number of suits against nonresident alien defendants,
federal prosecutors have begun to apply domestic criminal statutes to
foreign defendants to combat corruption overseas.11  For example,
commentators have noted that the “United States Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have
asserted jurisdiction over foreign defendants in a manner that seems
to greatly expand the reach of the law.”12  Despite the fact that the
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether the protec-
tions of the Due Process Clause extend to foreign nationals in extra-
territorial prosecutions, some legal scholars have.13  Countries around
6. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 347 (1935).
7. Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
8. Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5 (2006).
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id. at 4–5. See also Trek C. Doyle & Roberto Calvo Ponton, The Renaissance of the For-
eign Action and a Practical Response, 33 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 293, 294 (2002); Ronan E. Degnan &
Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien
Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 799–800 (1988) (describing the increase in transnational
litigation).
11. See generally Cara Chomski, Campbell’s Soup: Due Process Concerns in Applying the Fed-
eral Anti-Bribery Statute to Noncitizen Government Contractors Overseas, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
429, 429–33 (2012) (discussing the circuit split over which due process standards should apply to
noncitizens prosecuted under the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute for criminal acts committed ex-
traterritorially, mainly, whether the Due Process Clause requires a “sufficient nexus” standard,
or only that the prosecution be “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”).
12. J. Scott Maberry et al., FCPA Overreach? Courts Address Personal Jurisdiction in Cases
Against Foreign Defendants, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNS., MAY 2013, at 26, http://
www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2013/May/26.pdf.
13. Brian M. Kelly, Due Process, Choice of Law, and the Prosecution of Foreign Nationals for
Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organizations in Conflicts Abroad (Harvard Law School
Addison Brown Student Writing Prize, May 2015) at 2. Compare Lea Brilmayer & Charles
Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217,
1223 (1992) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment limits extraterritorial application of substantive
federal law similar to how the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause limits state power),
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the world are beginning to aggressively regulate activities such as brib-
ery, money laundering,  and securities violations, across national
boundaries.14  Today, the DOJ defines white collar crime as:
[T]hose illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, concealment,
or violation of trust and which are not dependent upon the applica-
tion or threat of physical force or violence.  Individuals and organi-
zations commit these acts to obtain money, property or services; to
avoid the payment or loss of money or services; or to secure per-
sonal or business advantage.15
Transnational white collar crime raises thorny jurisdictional issues
regarding a country’s power to impose its rules on others and its role
in the international community.16  The proliferation of transnational
activity and globalization ensures this trend will continue.17  The
growth of the internet has contributed to transnational litigation, as
aliens increasingly interact with the United States even when the alien
has no physical contact with the United States.18
In light of these developments, courts have struggled to find a con-
sistent approach in applying the Due Process Clause and remain di-
vided on what requirements must be met in order to assert jurisdiction
over foreign defendants.  The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits hold
that a “sufficient nexus” between the foreign defendant and the
United States is required before a noncitizen may be brought into fed-
eral court for acts committed abroad.19  However, the First, Third,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that due process requires prosecu-
tion of foreign defendants not be “arbitrary nor fundamentally un-
with A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 383 (1997) (arguing that extending the protections of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause to alien defendants in extraterritorial prosecutions would “den[y] to
the United States a degree of authority recognized and asserted by most of the other nations of
the world”).
14. White Collar/Investigations, WHITE & CASE LLP, https://www.whitecase.com/law/prac-
tices/white-collar-investigations (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
15. Megan Graham, White Collar Crime and the United States’ Economy, UNIVERSITY OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE SCHOLAR’S REPOSITORY, 1, 10 (2012); Stuart P. Green, The Concept of White
Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1, 11 (2004).
16. Gregory K. Matson, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts Over Transnational
Securities Fraud, 79 GEOG. L.J. 141 (1990).
17. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 10, at 799 (describing the increase in transnational litiga- R
tion); Gary A. Haugen, Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process Rights for Alien Defendants, 11
B.U. INT’L L.J. 109, 110 (1993) (discussing global integration and the “rapidly expanding system
of transnational activity”).
18. See Parrish, supra note 8, at 5. R
19. See, e.g., United States v. Mohammad-Omar, 323 Fed. App’x. 261 (4th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1998).
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fair.”20  Recently, the Southern District of New York decided United
States v. Hayes.21  In Hayes, the court expanded the scope of the Due
Process Clause and found that it is sufficient to allege a foreign defen-
dant aimed his conduct at the world in general.22
In the civil context, the Due Process Clause does not permit a state
to make a binding judgment against a person with whom the State has
no contacts, ties, or relations.23  If a defendant possesses certain mini-
mum contacts with the state, so that it is reasonable and just to assert
jurisdiction, the state can compel the defendant to defend herself in
the forum state.24  The “minimum contacts” test set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe v. Washington was established to protect defendants from
having to defend in a distant forum, unless the defendants have suffi-
cient contacts and could reasonably have anticipated being subjected
to the law of the forum.25  This is very similar to the “sufficient nexus”
and “neither unfair nor arbitrary” tests implemented by the circuit
courts.  The importance of these tests is critical to an understanding
when foreign defendants can be prosecuted.  Further, understanding
the due process elements required to prosecute foreign defendants is
important in today’s financially focused world.  Technological ad-
vancements have provided individuals with the tools to commit finan-
cial crimes on a global scale.26  As a result, these crimes are increasing
at an alarming rate.27  With this comes the challenge of how to effec-
tively prosecute these crimes without violating the due process rights
of foreign nationals, assuming they have such rights.28
This Comment argues that a stricter standard of due process should
be applied when determining whether courts have jurisdiction over
foreign defendants whose criminal activities are not directed at the
United States.  Financial crimes can lead to long prison sentences and
thus greater due process protections must be guaranteed.29  The “min-
20. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 552–53 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Martinez-Hi-
dalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993).
21. 99 F. Supp. 3d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
22. Id. at 422 (The court based its conclusion on the reasonable inference drawn from defen-
dant’s complaint that he was aware of the worldwide implications of his actions, and thus it was
not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair to subject him to prosecution in the United States.).
23. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
24. Id. at 317.
25. Id.
26. Gerald Cliff & Christian Desilets, White Collar Crime: What it is and Where It’s Going, 28
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 481, 523 (2014).
27. Id.
28. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 3. R
29. Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 52
(2006).
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imum contacts” test should be applied in the criminal context as well,
where it is even more important that the exercise of jurisdiction com-
ports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”30
The worldwide reliance theory was first introduced in the civil con-
text in 1972, and is now utilized in the criminal context.31  This theory
suggests the United States can prosecute foreign defendants for finan-
cial crimes not directed at the United States.  This does not satisfy due
process.  This Comment explains that the consequences of the United
States’ prosecutorial overreach can be detrimental to the rights pro-
vided by the Due Process Clause.
Part II provides background information concerning personal juris-
diction and international law.  It then examines “minimum contacts”
in the civil context.  It also discusses the circuit split regarding per-
sonal jurisdiction over foreign defendants, focusing on United States v.
Hayes and the worldwide reliance theory.  Part III analyzes the “suffi-
cient nexus” test, and the “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”
test, arguing the circuit split is merely illusory.  Part III further dis-
cusses the theory presented by United States v. Hayes and analyzes it
in light of relevant civil personal jurisdiction principles.  It concludes
by arguing that Hayes illustrates why the “minimum contacts” test
must be extended to financial crimes.  Ultimately, Part III proposes
the United States should implement a “minimum contacts” standard
to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants and argues that
applying any lesser standard violates the Fifth Amendment.  Part IV
discusses the legal implications of the worldwide reliance theory and
its impact on due process rights in the context of transnational finan-
cial crimes, highlighting the consequences if a stricter standard is not
adopted.  Part V concludes that the stricter standard of “minimum
contacts” for prosecution against foreign defendants is necessary to
comport with due process.
II. BACKGROUND: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND RELEVANT PERSONAL
JURISDICTION PRINCIPLES
This Part discusses the circuit split regarding due process rights for
foreign criminal defendants.  It begins with a brief overview of per-
sonal jurisdiction principles in the international context and then de-
scribes the “minimum contacts” analysis used in civil cases.  This Part
will then discuss both the “sufficient nexus” and the “neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair” tests used to determine whether United
30. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
31. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir. 1972).
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States prosecution comported with the Due Process Clause.  It will
conclude with a discussion of the Due Process Clause and its role in
white collar crimes.
The concept that no country should force its laws upon the world is
premised on principles of equity, comity, judicial power, and basic
human rights.32  Personal jurisdiction is of utmost importance to en-
sure that constitutional rights are not violated.33  The Second, Fourth,
and Ninth Circuits hold the extraterritorial prosecution of foreign na-
tionals under United States criminal law requires the existence of a
“sufficient nexus” between the defendant and the United States to
satisfy the Due Process Clause.34  The First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits all hold that to satisfy due process, prosecution “must not be
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”35  Both standards reflect an ef-
fort to preserve due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.36
However, in the criminal context these standards do not ensure the
due process rights of foreign defendants to sufficiently protect them
from prosecutorial overreach.
A. Personal Jurisdiction and International Law: A Brief Overview
For a valid exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, a United States
court must have both subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy
and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.37  The requirement of
personal jurisdiction stems from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause and applies to foreign defendants brought before a United
States court under extraterritorial federal legislation.38  Congress has
the authority to enact laws that have effect beyond the territorial bor-
ders of the United States.39  The constitutional limitations on Con-
gress’ ability to legislate extraterritorially are still unclear.  Recently,
courts and commentators have begun to “engage more foundational
questions about the existence and contours of constitutional limits on
Congress’s power to legislate extraterritorially in the first place and
the potential for individual rights violations under the Due Process
32. See generally Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Am. Law Inst. 1987).
33. Magna Carta: Muse and Mentor, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-
carta-muse-and-mentor/due-process-of-law.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
34. Chomski, supra note 11, at 439. R
35. See, e.g., Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1378; Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553.
36. Chomski, supra note 11, at 444. R
37. Bret A. Sumner, Due Process and True Conflicts: The Constitutional Limits on Extraterri-
torial Federal Legislation and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of
1996, 46 CATH. U. L.R. 907, 922–32 (1997).
38. Id. at 922–24.
39. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
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Clause resulting from the arbitrary or unfair applications of United
States law abroad.”40
Every day throughout the world national courts operate locally, ex-
ercising jurisdiction over their citizens and defendants that commit
crimes within their territory.41  But many of these courts are also au-
thorized to exercise jurisdiction over serious crimes subject to interna-
tional law—genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.42
White collar crimes have only recently been subjected to cross-border
prosecution because they can now more easily span multiple conti-
nents and include foreign nationals and corporations.43  Globalization
requires countries to aggressively police investment activities because
the ease of making international transactions has resulted in increased
white collar crime.44  When a foreign defendant’s criminal conduct did
not occur in the United States, the question arises as to whether those
activities are extensive enough to allow a United States federal court
to exercise jurisdiction.45
Where a defendant subjects herself to the laws of one nation, pun-
ishing her under United States law for a crime committed on foreign
soil is an intrusion into that nation’s sovereignty.46  As such, principles
of comity and fairness dictate that nations refrain from intruding ab-
sent a nexus between the defendant’s criminal conduct and the United
States.47
Thus, an intrusion across borders should not be undertaken absent
proof that there is a connection between the criminal conduct and the
United States, sufficient to justify the United States’ pursuit of its in-
terests.48  Under the “protective principle of international law a nation
40. Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019,
1022 (2011).
41. William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2002).
42. Id. at 13–14.
43. Michael J. Calhoun, Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Securities Fraud: Broaden-
ing the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 679–80 (1999).
44. Id. at 679.
45. Id. at 680.
46. See Chomski, supra note 11, at 445.
47. Id. See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (describing comity as “the recog-
nition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights
of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its law.”); Restatement
(Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States §115 (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (referenc-
ing principles of equity, in the sense of what is fair and just in major legal systems, as applicable
to the delineation of boundaries between countries and between the exclusive economic zones of
states).
48. Chomski, supra note 11, at 445. R
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is permitted to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct outside
the nation’s territory threatens that nation’s security.”49  Similarly,
“under the territorial principle of international law a state has jurisdic-
tion to prescribe and enforce a rule of law in the territory of another
state to the extent provided by international agreement with the other
state.”50
Extraterritorial prosecution and principals of international law
frame the question of how and under what circumstances federal
criminal laws should be applied against foreign defendants to comport
with the Due Process Clause.51  When noncitizens are tried for crimes
in the United States, they are entitled to all the rights that attach to
the criminal process, without any distinction based on their nationality
or citizenship.52  Seven circuits have considered what the due process
standard should be when prosecuting noncitizens for criminal acts.53
These circuits have held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause constrains the prosecutions of foreign defendants even if that
conduct occurs entirely abroad.54
B. “Minimum Contacts” in the Civil Context
In the civil context, for decades the main theory was that in per-
sonam jurisdiction could only be obtained over a corporation in the
state of its incorporation.55  However, in the mid-nineteenth century
two alternative theories began to emerge, which allowed states to as-
sert jurisdiction over foreign corporations.56  Under one theory, a
court could exercise jurisdiction over the corporation if it consented to
the jurisdiction.57  Under an alternative theory, jurisdiction could be
49. United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988)).
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 437.
52. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[O]nce an alien
lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to all people within our borders.  Such rights include those protected by the First
and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
53. Chomski, supra note 11, at 430–31. R
54. See United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 393 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d
929, 943–44 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (assuming without deciding that the Due Process Clause constrains
extraterritorial prosecutions); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011);
Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1378–79.
55. Westerberg, Foreign Corporations – Minimum Contacts – Due Process, 36 J. AIR L. &
COM. 346, 347 (1970).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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based upon the corporation’s presence within the state.58  This all
changed when the Supreme Court decided International Shoe v.
Washington.59
In International Shoe the defendant was a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, and was en-
gaged in the manufacture and sale of footwear.60  Defendant em-
ployed salesmen in Washington to sell shoes in the state.61  The state
of Washington sued the defendant after they failed to make contribu-
tions to an unemployment compensation fund exacted by state stat-
utes.62  The defendant argued it was not “doing business” in the state,
and that there was no agent upon which the service could be made.63
In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that due process
requires a foreign defendant have certain “minimum contacts” with
the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”64  The “mini-
mum contacts” test was a significant departure from the earlier con-
sent and presence theories and allowed states to more easily secure
jurisdiction over non-residents.65  However, the “minimum contacts”
standard presented no rule to determine what constituted a “contact”
or how many “contacts” were necessary to satisfy the test.66
Many lower courts implemented a three-part test to determine
whether minimum contacts exist to establish jurisdiction, considering
whether: (1) the defendant purposely availed herself of the privilege
of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum
state, (2) the cause of action arises out of the defendant’s conduct with
the forum state, and (3) the defendant has a sufficiently substantial
connection to the forum state so exercise of jurisdiction is not unrea-
sonable.67  Indeed, “courts have applied the ‘minimum contacts’ test
of International Shoe v. Washington and its progeny very conserva-
58. Id.  Under this theory, to be deemed present within a state, the corporation must conduct
sufficient activities to be considered “doing business” within that state. Id.  However, no defini-
tive rule was established to determine what activity constituted “doing business.” Id. Factors
considered by the courts included the amount and continuity of the activity, whether or not the
corporation had a local agent or office within the forum state, and the convenience of the forum
and availability of other forums.
59. See generally Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 310–22.
60. Id. at 313.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 311–13.
63. Id. at 312–13.
64. Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316.
65. Westerberg, supra note 55, at 348 R
66. Gary W. Melsher, Civil Personal–Jurisdiction–Minimum Contacts, 14 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 610, 611 (1963).
67. Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987).
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tively when the defendant is a foreign state or corporation acting in a
commercial capacity.”68  Courts have held that the test requires a de-
fendant avail herself to the benefits and protections of the forum’s
laws before she will be subject to suit in that forum.69  “This restrictive
approach discourages a United States citizen who wants to take ad-
vantage of international business transactions and trade but who is
hesitant to enter into such arrangement without the assurance of a
forum in the event of a dispute.”70
The decision in International Shoe represented a major shift from a
pure territorial analysis to a more expansive approach.  It has been
hypothesized that this shift occurred because people do not pay atten-
tion to state boundaries; thus, the assumption that they did often re-
sulted in the unwitting destruction of their own rights.71  The
jurisprudence developed as a result of this has been aptly described as
a “maze of rules with no clear and distinct reasons.”72
This general confusion over due process limitations has spilled over
into the criminal context where the lack of a clear cut Supreme Court
standard has resulted in the circuits applying varying tests.73  Thus, a
circuit split exists over what due process standards should apply to
noncitizens prosecuted for criminal acts committed entirely outside of
the United States.74
C. “Sufficient Nexus” Standard of Due Process
The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits utilize the “sufficient
nexus” test.  This test allows for extraterritorial prosecution of foreign
nationals under United States criminal law when “there is a sufficient
nexus between the defendant and the United States to satisfy the Due
Process Clause.”75  Courts applying this test typically rely on four fac-
tors: “(1) the defendant’s actual contacts with the United States . . . ;
(2) the location of the acts allegedly giving rise to the alleged offense;
(3) the intended effect a defendant’s conduct has on or within the
68. Eric Johnson & Chrisanne Worthington, Minimum Contacts Jurisdiction Under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act, 12 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 209, 209 (1982).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Joelle Lee A. Nicol, Note, Given an Opportunity to Redefine the Gray Area of “Minimum
Contacts,” the Court in Prince v. Urban Chose to Remain in the Dark, 25 W. ST. U. L. REV. 313,
354–55 (1998).
72. Id.
73. Kelly, supra note 13, at 2. R
74. Chomski, supra note 11, at 430–31. R
75. Id. at 439.
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United States; and (4) the impact on significant United States
interests.”76
The Ninth Circuit was the first court to articulate the “sufficient
nexus” test.77  Eight years later in Klimavicius-Violaria,78 the Ninth
Circuit equated the “sufficient nexus” standard to the “minimum con-
tacts” test for personal jurisdiction established in Worldwide Volk-
swagen v. Woodson.79  Accordingly, the court held that the United
States “will assert jurisdiction over a defendant who should reasona-
bly anticipate being brought into court in this country.”80  Therefore,
the circuit courts that require a sufficient nexus “look for real effects
or consequences accruing in the United States.”81
In United States v. Klimavicius-Violaria,82 the defendants were con-
victed for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on board a
vessel.83  The defendants argued that the government did not establish
a “sufficient nexus.”84  The Ninth Circuit clarified that a “sufficient
nexus” exists “where an attempted transaction is aimed at causing
criminal acts within the United States.”85  It agreed with the district
court’s factual findings that:
(1) markings on the cocaine matched the markings on cocaine that
had been seized in the United States, (2) the United States was the
most likely destination for such a large load of cocaine, and (3) the
location of the ship and the kind of navigational maps on board
were consistent with the cocaine being bound for the United
States.86
76. Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088, at *4 (collecting cases).  The “sufficient nexus” test can be
satisfied when a foreign defendant “aim[s] . . . to cause harm inside the United States or to U.S.
citizens or interests.”  United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011).  It can also be
satisfied when the foreign defendant’s conduct occurs outside the United States and has certain
effects within the United States.  In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 412 (7th Cir. 2009).
77. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and
the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 162 (2007) (“In the
case that seems to have spawned the recent Fifth Amendment due process jurisprudence in this
area, United States v. Davis, [905 F.2d 245, (9th Cir. 1990),] the Ninth Circuit held that . . . ‘there
must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States . . . .’”).
78. United States v. Klimavicius-Violaria, 144 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998).
79. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980).
80. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1257 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at
297.
81. United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2011).
82. 144 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998).
83. Id. at 1256.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1257.
86. Id.
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The court held this evidence provided a “sufficient nexus” between
the defendant’s activities and the United States to satisfy due
process.87
More recently, the “sufficient nexus” test has been invoked in civil
cases involving a suit seeking damages resulting from a financial fraud.
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment v. Maxwell, the defendants al-
legedly conspired to purchase stock in a British publisher at inflated
prices.88  The plaintiffs argued personal jurisdiction existed over the
defendant accounting firm because it must have known its reports on
the publisher would be relied on by purchasers.89  The court dis-
agreed, explaining that under that line of reasoning, “accountants op-
erating solely in London would be subjected to personal jurisdiction in
any country whose citizen had purchased stock of a company they had
audited.”90  The court found that “[a]lthough such worldwide reliance
may be, in a sense, foreseeable, it is not sufficiently so to constitute a
basis of personal jurisdiction consonant with due process.”91
The lack of sufficient judicial guidance concerning financial crime
and due process standards as opposed to terrorism and drug cases has
resulted in confusion for lower courts.  Terrorism and drug trafficking
cases provide for a simple analysis of due process issues and yield pre-
dictable results.  A foreign defendant directs his conduct by selling
drugs to the United States and this will result in the United States’
ability to prosecute that defendant.  Directly analogous to this exam-
ple is a foreign defendant selling a security in a foreign country to
someone in the United States.  Yet, the due process analysis is easily
applied in the first case and loosely applied in the latter because the
lack of sufficient judicial guidance concerning financial crimes occur-
ring outside of the United States.
D. Prosecution Must Not Be “Arbitrary nor Fundamentally Unfair”
The standard applied in the First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits
is that the prosecution “must not be arbitrary nor fundamentally un-
fair” to satisfy due process.92  These courts find that due process does
87. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1259.
88. 468 F.2d 1326, 1330 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–67 (2010) (stating that the Securities & Exchange Act does not
focus “upon the place were the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities
in the United States” and, accordingly, Section 10(b) of the Act only applies to “transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities”).
89. Id. at 1342.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See generally Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370; Cardales, 168 F.3d 548.
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not require the government to establish a nexus between a defen-
dant’s criminal conduct and the United States.93  Instead, these courts
focus on: (1) the offender’s contacts with the United States; (2) the
impact of the alleged conduct with the United States, its interests, and
its citizens; and (3) whether the host nation consents to the exercise of
jurisdiction over its citizens.94
In United States v. Cardales, the defendants were convicted of pos-
session with intent to distribute drugs aboard a vessel 150 miles south
of Puerto Rico.95  The defendants argued the court did not have juris-
diction because the government did not prove a nexus between the
criminal conduct and the United States.96  The First Circuit held the
Fifth Amendment does not require a nexus between the defendant
and the United States.97  Instead, the court held that to satisfy due
process, extraterritorial application of the criminal statute simply
“must not be arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”98  The court, like
the Third Circuit, expressly declined to adopt a nexus requirement.99
The court held that since the vessel was registered by a country that
consented to the application of United States law, the action was not
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.100  The flag nation’s consent elimi-
nates any concern that U.S. prosecution will be arbitrary or funda-
mentally unfair.101  Accordingly, personal jurisdiction was established.
In U.S. v. Martinez-Hidalgo,102 the defendant was charged with pos-
session of cocaine on the high seas with intent to distribute in viola-
tion of Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.103  The defendant
alleged the statute did not apply to him because he was a nonresident
alien on a foreign vessel located outside United States waters.104  Spe-
cifically, he argued there was an insufficient nexus between his activi-
93. Chomski, supra note 11, at 442–43. R
94. Id. at 449–50. See also Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1378–79 n.4 (discussing the “objec-
tive” principle where Congress may criminalize behavior that has a “nexus” to the United States,
citing Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations in support).
95. 168 F.3d 548, 551 (1st Cir. 1999).
96. Id. at 552.
97. Id. at 553.
98. Id.
99. Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553 (“We decide today that due process does not require the govern-
ment to prove a nexus between a defendant’s criminal conduct and the United States in a prose-
cution under the MDLEA when the flag nation has consented to the application of United
States law to the defendants.”).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 552.
102. 993 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1993).
103. 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a) (2016) (formerly cited as 46 U.S.C. §1903(a) (Supp. 1992)); Marti-
nez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1053.
104. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1053.
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ties and the United States to sustain the district court’s jurisdiction.105
The Third Circuit found that punishing persons apprehended with
narcotics on the high seas was not “fundamentally unfair.”106  How-
ever, the court was not suggesting that Congress yields unlimited
power to subject conduct on the high seas to United States prosecu-
tions.107  Rather, the court acknowledged “there might be a due pro-
cess problem if Congress provided for the extraterritorial application
of United States law to conduct on the high seas without regard for a
domestic nexus if that conduct were generally lawful throughout the
world.”108
The Third Circuit has made clear that by rejecting the “sufficient
nexus” due process approach, it is also rejecting the relevance of civil
personal jurisdiction principles.109  However, the Supreme Court has
derived the relevant personal jurisdiction principles from both civil
and criminal cases and has never suggested that criminal defendants
are entitled to less due process.110  These circuits do not require a
nexus to be established to comport with Due Process, but instead fo-
cus on fairness grounded in principles of international law.111
E. Confronting a New Due Process Test: Worldwide Reliance and
United States v. Hayes
Established “minimum contacts” principles have traditionally been
utilized in the civil context as opposed to criminal.  Recently in United
States v. Hayes, the court used the “sufficient nexus” test in a financial
crime case.112  The codefendants allegedly conspired to commit wire
fraud by manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
by presenting false and misleading submissions to the British Banker’s
Association.  The codefendants allegedly attempted to increase the
profitability of their trading positions to the detriment of other institu-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1056.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Perez-Ovideo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Perez-Oviedo’s
reference to cases such as International Shoe Co. v. Washington and Asahi Metal Industry Co.,
Ltd. v. Superior Court of California is unavailing, for those cases, which deal with non-resident
corporations subject to liability for placing goods in the steam of commerce of another state, are
inapposite.”).
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Darin v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1223 (2017) (No.
16-564), 2002 WL 6276644.
111. See generally Chomski, supra note 11, at 432–43 R
112. 99 F. Supp. 3d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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tions, at least one of which was located in New York.113  The resulting
rate was widely published.114
One of the codefendants, Darin, was a Swiss citizen living in Japan
at the time of the alleged offense.115  He sought to dismiss the com-
plaint because it violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process.116
Darin argued that, “as a foreign national charged with conspiring to
manipulate a foreign financial benchmark, for a foreign currency,
while working for a foreign bank, in a foreign country, he lack[ed] a
sufficient nexus to the United States and did not have constitutionally
adequate notice that his alleged conduct was criminal.”117  Darin fur-
ther argued the guarantee of due process is absent because “the aim
of his activity was not to cause harm inside the United States or to any
U.S. citizens or interests.”118
The court disagreed and found the codefendants conspired to ma-
nipulate the LIBOR for Yen and were aware that it would be pub-
lished in the United States.119  Based on a worldwide reliance theory
the court held the defendant “was aware that such trades would likely
have counterparties in the United States and particularly in a center of
international finance like New York.”120  The court noted that
whether he intended to harm the United States was not dispositive.121
Disregarding minimum contacts jurisprudence, the court concluded a
sufficient nexus existed between Darin and the United States to sat-
isfy due process because Darin’s conduct affected the overall Yen LI-
BOR fixings.122
F. Financial Crimes and their Relation to Fifth Amendment
Due Process
A clear standard regarding the scope of Fifth Amendment protec-
tion in criminal cases against foreign defendants is necessary to guide
prosecutors in combating the growth of financial crimes.123  The DOJ




117. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 412 (quoting Def. Memo. at 1–2.)
118. Id. at 422–23.
119. Id. at 422.
120. Id.
121. Id. (“‘[A] substantial intended effect in or on the United States is sufficient but not nec-
essary’ to satisfy the Fifth Amendment.”) (quoting United States v. Yousef, No. S3 08 Cr.
1213(JFK), 2010 WL 3377499, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010)).
122. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 110, at 11. R
123. Christina Jackson, Combating the New Generation of Money Laundering: Regulations
and Agencies in the Battle of Compliance, Avoidance, and Prosecution in a Post-September 11
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has become increasingly interested in white collar cases against for-
eign defendants124 due to the proliferation of financial crimes in re-
cent years.125  The FBI’s Financial Crimes Section experienced a
thirty-seven percent increase in corporate crimes cases from 2007 to
2011, a fifty-one percent increase in securities and commodities fraud
cases, and a 124% increase in mortgage fraud cases.126
U.S. citizens are expected to comply with thousands of laws and
regulations.127  As a  result of the increasing breadth of U.S. jurisdic-
tion, foreign defendants too must now consider whether they are com-
plying with these laws and regulations.128  The prosecution of white
collar crimes is at the top of the DOJ’s Criminal Division’s priority
list.129  As white collar investigations expand across the globe the DOJ
increasingly locates and prosecutes foreign defendants.130  The DOJ’s
World, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 139, 139 (2004) (“Increasing globalization, the opening of markets,
and the proliferation of both officially sanctioned and underground financial networks have con-
tributed to an exponential growth” of financial crimes, including a variety of white collar
crimes.).
124. Hogan Lovells, When do White Collar Criminal Statutes Apply to Extraterritorial Con-
duct?, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=de76eaf9-3f09-
4d12-be20-67f48a3c37fc.  This is evidenced by an increase in enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) and more frequent investigations into high profile criminal cases in the
automotive and banking industries. Id.
125. Id.; Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice, Re-
marks at the Securities Enforcement Forum West Conference (May 12, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-securi-
ties-enforcement; White Collar Crime Statistics, ONLINE LAWYER SOURCE, http://www.onlinelaw
yersource.com/white-collar/statistics/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2016).
126. Financial Crimes Report 2010-2011, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (the fiscal years
2010-2011 represent calendar dates Oct. 1, 2009 through Sept. 30, 2011),  http://www.fbi.gov/
stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011.  For a discussion on white collar
crimes, see generally Cliff, supra note 26.  For a discussion on the financial effects on white-collar R
crimes, see Graham, supra note 15, at 11, 16 (The amount of money the U.S. government pays R
out to prosecute white collar crime is about $252 million each year.  Businesses worldwide lose
approximately $221 billion a year in fraud. The rough estimate of money that is stolen, embez-
zled or misrepresented is about $300 billion.).
127. Radley Balko, The Power of the Prosecutor, THE HUFFINGTON POST (March 18, 2013)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/16/the-power-of-the-prosecut_n_2488653.html.
That isn’t possible of course.  It would probably take you most of the year to under-
stand them all, at which point you’d have the next year’s batch of new laws to learn . . . .
Worse, while we citizens can go to prison for unwittingly breaking laws of which we
weren’t aware, prosecutors and law enforcement officers who wrongly arrest, charge,




129. Lauren Briggerman, DOJ is Losing the Battle to Prosecute Foreign Executives, LAW 360
(Mar. 3, 2015, 10:40AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/626482/doj-is-losing-the-battle-to-pros-
ecute-foreign-executives.
130. Id.
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Antitrust Division has stated its goal is to ensure culpable foreign na-
tionals, just like United States coconspirators, serve sentences for vio-
lating United States laws.131  DOJ investigations have led to the
conviction of American, Swiss, German, Canadian, and Japanese
firms—including a number of top executives who have served jail
sentences.132  While prosecution of white collar crime may be increas-
ing, this should not result in the destruction of fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees of due process.
III. ANALYSIS: CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES IN
THE PROSECUTIONS OF FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
This Part discusses the differences between the circuit courts’ juris-
dictional analysis involving foreign defendants.  First, this Part ana-
lyzes the “sufficient nexus” test in light of its similarities to the
“fundamentally unfair” test, and argues the circuit court split is illu-
sory.  Second, this Part discusses the emerging worldwide reliance the-
ory from United States v. Hayes and analyzes it in relation to relevant
civil personal jurisdiction principles.  Third, this Part argues a stricter
standard is necessary in criminal cases, specifically in the context of
financial crimes.  Ultimately, this Part proposes that U.S. Courts im-
plement a “minimum contacts” standard in order to assert personal
jurisdiction over foreign criminal defendants and argues applying any-
thing less is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
A. An Analysis of the Current Due Process Standard
The seven Federal Appellate Courts that have considered the issue
of the appropriate due process standard for noncitizens prosecuted for
criminal acts committed entirely outside of the United States are split
into two camps.133  The circuits all agree that the extraterritorial appli-
cation of United States law to foreign nationals cannot be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair.134   However, the circuits disagree on what is
“arbitrary or unfair.”135  The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits eval-
uate fundamental fairness by looking to connections between the
United States and the defendant’s conduct and the U.S. interests that
131. Id.  See also Criminal Program Update 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVI-
SION, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/criminal-program-update (“Last year, the
Division secured the first ever extradition on an antitrust charge.”).
132. Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice
.gov/atr/file/800691/download.
133. Chomski, supra note 11, at 430. R
134. Kelly, supra note 13, at 25. R
135. Id.
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arise from those contacts.136  The First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits evaluate fundamental fairness by focusing on notice.  Accord-
ingly, these circuits look to whether international law provided the
defendant with a fair warning that he could be compelled to defend
himself in a United States court.137  The Brehm factors illustrate how
courts on both sides of the circuit split analyze whether the Due Pro-
cess Clause can be satisfied.138  The Brehm factors include:
(1) the defendant’s actual contacts with the United States, including
his citizenship or residency; (2) the location of the acts allegedly
giving rise to the alleged offense; (3) the intended effect a defen-
dant’s conduct has on or within the United States; and (4) the im-
pact on significant United States interests.139
Courts often fail to provide a clear statement of the test used to deter-
mine whether jurisdiction is consistent with due process and the opin-
ions often lack the clarity necessary to provide guidance for lower
courts.140  The fourth Brehm factor seems to be all encompassing, the
upshot being that all foreign conduct can at some point affect U.S.
interests.  However, U.S. interests should not dictate a foreign defen-
dant’s procedural rights.141  If this were so, due process would be satis-
fied in virtually every case because the United States can always assert
an interest in federal prosecution.142  This can result in overzealous
prosecutions and the United States “turning federal courts into inter-
national law enforcement arenas.”143
It is apparent that a foreign national who directs, or intends to di-
rect, his conduct towards the United States should reasonably foresee
the possibility of being prosecuted by the U.S. government.  However,
it is far less apparent that every foreign national should be reasonably
aware that his conduct threatens United States interests.144  This is
because the United States has “complex and cross-cutting strategic in-
terests in every corner of the globe.”145  The entanglement of U.S.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Chomski, supra note 11, at 444. See also Edward F. Roche, Due Process by Proxy:
United States v. Brehm and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals, 91
N.C. L. REV. 1463, 1473–76 (2013).
139. Id. at 444 (citing Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088, at *4).  See also Roche, supra note 138, at R
1474, 1477.
140. Roche, supra note 138, at 1474. R
141. Id. at 1481.
142. Id.
143. Id. For example, in terrorism prosecutions, “United States courts are trying people who
were not targeting the United States, are not from the United States, and before their court
cases, had never set foot in the United States.” Id.
144. Kelly, supra note 13, at 30. R
145. Id.
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interests and global finance is complex and the current jurisdictional
tests provide little guidance for U.S. prosecutors attempting to deter-
mine whether U.S. interests are sufficiently affected as to satisfy the
fourth factor in Brehm.  Accordingly, if U.S. prosecutors can reasona-
bly struggle to infer whether the U.S. will exercise jurisdiction, how
can a foreign defendant be expected to make this determination?
Thus, the concept of fair warning can be elusive.
Despite the existence of a long-standing circuit split, the difference
in the approaches is marginal.  Accordingly, the application of the
“sufficient nexus” and “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”
standards often differ very little.146  Courts have taken note, stating
that the difference between the two standards is “less real than appar-
ent; the existence of a nexus is what makes the prosecution neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”147  Both sides of the split use sim-
ilar reasoning when determining whether extraterritorial application
of a statute is consistent with due process.148  Commentators have
even argued that:
[T]he nexus test is actually a variation of the notice test because, in
looking to whether a foreign national voluntarily affiliated himself
with the United States by committing an extraterritorial act that did,
does, or will have some impact on the United States, the nexus test
ensures that the alien defendant had fair warning that the United
States could prosecute him for his conduct.149
In United States v. Klimavicius-Violaria, the district court found the
requirements for due process were satisfied because the defendant in-
tended to affect the United States and its interests abroad.150  Simi-
larly, in United States v. Cardales, the court found prosecution was
“neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair” because American inter-
ests abroad were compromised.151  The 20-year-old circuit court split
is illusory because courts apply the same criteria to determine whether
a “sufficient nexus” exists or whether the prosecution is neither “arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair.”152
146. Chomski, supra note 11, at 444. R
147. United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728–29 n.9 (E.D. Va. 2003) (com-
paring the “nexus” standard utilized in the Ninth Circuit against the “neither arbitrary nor fun-
damentally unfair” standard utilized in the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits).
148. Chomski, supra note 11, at 444–48. R
149. Kelly, supra note 13, at 26. See also Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 119 (“The idea of fair warning R
is that ‘no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.’”) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964));
Colangelo, supra note 77, at 166 (arguing that “[t]he nexus requirement merely functions to R
ensure that the criteria [of the notice requirement] are met”).
150. Klimavicius-Violaria, 144 F.3d at 125.
151. Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553.
152. Chomski, supra note 11, at 429–31. R
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Further, the criteria these courts use for due process analysis is
equivalent to the determination that “minimum contacts” exist in a
civil context.153  In civil cases, jurisdiction is proper if the defendant
purposely took advantage of the forum state, if the cause of action
arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, and there
is a substantial connection to the forum state ensuring jurisdiction will
not be unreasonable.154  The question for purposes of both the crimi-
nal “sufficient nexus” test and for civil personal jurisdiction is whether
a defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in this
country.  When the Supreme Court first articulated the “minimum
contacts” test in International Shoe, it relied on a criminal case that
considered whether a U.S. citizen who resided abroad could be haled
into a U.S. court.155
If the plaintiff in International Shoe had argued the defendant’s ac-
tions in another state, not the forum state, merely had some minor
effect on the economy, surely that would not be sufficient to establish
jurisdiction over defendant.  In the civil context, this reliance interest
would not be available to establish jurisdiction over defendants who
did not aim any conduct at that state because there was no real or
actual effects occurring in that state.  The Plaintiff would fail to satisfy
the “minimum contacts” test in civil context because the defendant
would have no “ties, contacts or relations” to that state.”156  Thus, it
should not be enough in the criminal context as well, where greater
due process protection is required.
B. The Worldwide Reliance Theory and the Need
for “Minimum Contacts”
Historically, for both civil and criminal cases, courts exercised juris-
diction over those parties who were physically before the court.157
Courts have relaxed this requirement in the civil context, asserting ju-
risdiction over persons with certain connections with the forum
state.158  The jurisdiction problem in the criminal context is most seri-
ous.159  The power of criminal courts is strictly localized, lacking the
flexibility afforded to civil courts by the doctrine of personal jurisdic-
153. Id. at 457–58.
154. Id. at 458 (citing Schneider v. Hardesty, 669 F.3d 693, 701–04 (6th Cir. 2012)).
155. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436–38 (1932).
156. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
157. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996).
158. Id.  (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction originally derived from physical control or custody over the
defendant.”).
159. Id. at 4.
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tion premised on “minimum contacts.”160  In the criminal context, per-
sonal jurisdiction is still based on physical presence in the forum state,
which is traditionally obtained through an arrest.161  Furthermore, nu-
merous countries, including the United States, guarantee defendants a
right to be present.162
The issue of whether the United States can assert jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant should begin with the question of “whether a defen-
dant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society or econ-
omy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the
sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to judgment con-
cerning that conduct.”163  Respect for these principles is essential to
avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of na-
tions.164  Under established due process principles governing personal
jurisdiction, foreign defendants should not be haled into federal court
based on a theory of “worldwide reliance”—the view that a defen-
dant’s conduct was not aimed at the United States, but rather at the
world generally.165  The “sufficient nexus” and “fundamentally unfair”
tests require at a minimum, that the domestic effect occurs as a direct
and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory.166  Under
established “minimum contacts” principles governing personal juris-
diction, foreign defendants cannot be subjected to U.S. federal courts
for foreign conduct aimed generally at world financial markets.167
In United States v. Hayes, the district court identified two allega-
tions that established a sufficient nexus between the defendant, Darin,
160. Id.
161. Id. at 35.
162. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) (for the United States).  The rule states: “[T]he defendant must be
present at: (1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea; (2) every trial stage,
including jury impaneling and the return of the verdict; and (3) sentencing.” Id. See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural
Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
235, 279–80 (1993) (noting that after surveying a non-exhaustive list of international instruments,
the right to be tried in one’s own presence is guaranteed only by the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and further noting that while nearly twenty five countries have this
right enshrined in their national constitution, these constitutions also provide exceptions, such as
when the accused flees the jurisdiction).
163. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011).
164. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). See also United
States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Punishing crimes committed on . . . foreign
soil . . . is an intrusion into the sovereign territory of another nation.”).
165. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Roger Darin’s Motion to Dismiss the
Criminal Complaint at Part III.A.1–2, United States v. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2015
(No. 12 MJ 3229), 2014 WL 10542903.
166. Leasco Data, 468 F.2d at 1341.
167. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Roger Darin’s Motion, supra note
165, at Part III.A.3. R
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and the United States: (1) Darin used United States wires to cause the
publication of manipulated interest rate information in New York, and
(2) Darin’s coconspirator, Hayes, had ample connections to the
United States including trades with a counterparty based in New
York.168  Neither of these two allegations begins to establish “mini-
mum contacts” sufficient to assert jurisdiction between Darin and the
United States.169  The first allegation implies that Darin could be sub-
jected to personal jurisdiction in any country whose citizen had pur-
chased Libor-related products.170  This worldwide reliance is
foreseeable but does not constitute a basis of personal jurisdiction in
agreement with due process.  The second allegation fails to state a
“sufficient nexus” because it relies on contacts of a co-conspirator.171
However, due process is a threshold standard that demands fairness to
each individual defendant—each defendant’s contacts must be as-
sessed individually.172  Due process should depend on the contacts
Darin himself created with the forum state.173  The court failed to rec-
ognize that in the criminal context, the “sufficient nexus” requirement
is parallel to the “minimum contacts” requirement in the civil context.
Both protect defendants due process interests and, if anything, the
“sufficient nexus” requirement should be more protective than its civil
counterpart.
Additionally, the District Court brushed aside the similarities to
Leasco Data and “minimum contacts.”174  The facts in Hayes are vir-
tually identical to Leasco: both defendants were alleged to have
manipulated a piece of financial information outside the United States
that was then published worldwide, including in the United States.175
The court in Hayes, like the plaintiffs in Leasco Data, reasoned that
the defendant
was aware that the Yen LIBOR was published in the United States,
and it is a reasonable inference from the Complaint that, as a trader
in short-term interest rates, he was aware that such trades would
168. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 422.
169. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Roger Darin’s Motion, supra note 165, at R
Part III.A.3.




174. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 424 n.4.
175. Leasco Data, 468 F.2d at 1330–33; Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 411–12.
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likely have counterparties in the United States and particularly in a
center of international finance like New York.176
But this reasoning means Darin could be subjected to personal juris-
diction in any country where a citizen purchased Libor-related prod-
ucts.177  If true, anyone in the world dealing with financial transactions
must assume they can be subjected to the laws of the United States,
and conversely, anyone in the United States then must assume they
could be subjected to the laws of any other country.178  This contra-
dicts the fundamental guarantee that all criminal proceedings will be
fair and the defendant will be given notice, and an opportunity to be
heard, before the government acts to take away one’s liberty.179
Accordingly, due process is violated if a court exercises jurisdiction
over a defendant,  unless the defendant’s conduct is directed at the
United States, as opposed to the world at large.180  The crime must
arise out of the defendant’s contacts with the United States, or the
United States financial market, and the defendant must have a suffi-
ciently substantial connection to the United States so that asserting
jurisdiction is reasonable.181  A foreign actor trading Yen in Japan
does not have a substantial connection to the United States.  It cannot
be said that a foreign actor’s crime, not aimed at the United States but
rather aimed at the global financial market, is sufficient to constitute
“minimum contacts” with the U.S.  If a court applies the reasoning
from Hayes, a foreign actor could be haled into a United States court
for manipulating finances that affect the world at large, but that had
minimal or no effect on the United States.
Throughout Hayes, the court resisted any comparison of the crimi-
nal “sufficient nexus” test and civil “minimum contacts” principles,
yet many cases recognize the relationship between the two stan-
176. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 422.  In Leasco Data, the court reasoned that that defendant
“must have known that its reports on Pergamon would be relied on by anyone interested in
buying Pergamon shares,” including in the United States.  468 F.2d at 1342.
177. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Roger Darin’s Motion, supra note 165, at R
Part III.A.3. (quoting Leasco Data, 468 F.2d at 1342).
178. Id.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
180. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 110, at 1. R
181. See generally Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17.
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dards.182  Both standards address the same basic question: when may a
person in one country be subject to the laws of another?  The major
flaw in Hayes is the court’s refusal to recognize the similarities of the
due process principles in the civil and criminal context.183 Criminal
defendants are not entitled to any lesser standard of due process than
civil defendants.  To the contrary, the Supreme Court has expressly
stated that “due process, as an expression of fundamental procedural
fairness, requires a more stringent standard for criminal trials than for
ordinary civil litigation.”184  Rejecting the relevance of the “minimum
contacts” test, the court concluded Darin’s prosecution did not violate
due process.185  The only allegation against Darin was that he con-
spired to alter USB’s Yen Libor submission, which in turn affected the
overall Yen Libor fixings.186  As a trader in Japan, he did not intend to
harm the United States.  Further, as a foreign citizen, Darin did not
have ties, contacts or relations with the United States.  If the court
applied civil personal jurisdiction principles it would have been com-
pelled to dismiss the case because the complaint failed to allege “mini-
mum contacts” between Darin and the United States.187  Courts have
already applied this standard in the civil cases and should have no
apprehensions with extending it to the criminal context.
Understanding the importance of “minimum contacts” and due pro-
cess is the key to resolving the circuit court split regarding the appro-
priate due process standard for foreign defendants charged with
financial crimes.  Due process is a threshold standard that demands
fairness to the defendant and depends on “contacts the defendant
himself creates with the forum State.”188  The question—both for the
criminal “sufficient nexus” test and for the civil “minimum contacts”
test—is whether the defendant should reasonably anticipate being
182. For cases relying on minimum contacts principles, see, Mohammad-Omar, 323 F. App’x
at 261; United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Perlaza,
439 F.3d 1149, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 829 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2003); Yousef, 327 F.3d at 111–12; Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1257; Davis, 905 F.2d at
249 n.2 (relying on international law jurisdictional principles “as a rough guide of whether a
sufficient nexus exists”); United States v. Sidorenko, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
183. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 424 n.4.
184. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
185. Hayes, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 422 n.4.
186. Id. at 412.
187. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 110, at 19–20.  The complaint failed to allege
“‘minimum contacts’ between him[self] and the United States, and this failure “is underscored
by the fate of civil complaints that have involved essentially the same allegations. Id.
188. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations
omitted).
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haled into court.189  When the connection between a defendant’s ac-
tions and the United States is merely “worldwide reliance,” a U.S.
court should not have jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction should be reserved for
countries that have a sufficient nexus with the defendant.
A stricter standard that provides more protection for the due pro-
cess rights of foreign defendants charged with financial crimes is nec-
essary.  A “minimum contacts” test that focuses “on the conduct,
connections, knowledge, and intent of the offender” will ensure for-
eign prosecutions comport with due process and fundamental fair-
ness.190  Federal courts should not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant until it is established that the defendant had sufficient
“minimum contacts” with the United States.
C. A Stricter Due Process Standard in the Global Financial Market
Bringing criminals to justice ensures the world is safe, orderly, and
fair.  However, in this pursuit of justice certain fundamental guaran-
tees must be protected, especially due process.  Therefore, courts
should consider whether a foreign defendant facing criminal charges
has sufficient “minimum contacts,” such that it is reasonable and fair
to hale a defendant into a foreign court when the conduct was not
intentionally aimed at that forum.
A foreign national should anticipate prosecution in the United
States if he provides support to a terrorist organization that threatens
U.S. interests.191  Similarly, a foreign national should reasonably antic-
ipate being prosecuted by the U.S. government if he distributes arms
or drugs that end up in the United States or affect United States’ in-
terests.192  The protection of United States national security interests
is a sound justification for asserting jurisdiction over foreign defend-
ants.  In these instances, “convenience and the defendant’s burden
should play little to no role in the jurisdictional analysis . . . while state
interests must play a greater role.”193  Thus, in many cases, “it cannot
be argued seriously that the defendant’s conduct was so unrelated to
American interests as to render their prosecution in the United States
[unreasonable or] arbitrary.”194  Defendants should be on notice and
reasonably foresee the application of U.S. law when their conduct di-
189. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Roger Darin’s Motion, supra note 165, at R
Part III.A.1.
190. Chomski, supra note 11, at 460. R
191. Kelly, supra note 13, at 30. R
192. See id.
193. Parrish, supra note 8, at 55. R
194. Roche, supra note 138, at 1491 (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at 112). R
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rectly threatens the United States.195  However, there must be
constraints.
An individual who participates in a financial conspiracy should not
face criminal charges from a nation that was not significantly impacted
by the conduct.  Otherwise, globalization and financial interdepen-
dence would destroy the due process rights of foreign defendants that
have committed crimes affecting global finance.  For financial crimes
defendants should be required to have sufficient contacts with the fo-
rum to make haling them into a U.S. court reasonable.  A “minimum
contacts” analysis would provide guidance for federal prosecutors
and, conversely, prevent overzealous prosecutions.196
The aforementioned circuit split creates confusion and provides
minimal guidance to prosecutors.  This lack of guidance allows, or per-
haps encourages, prosecutors to continue to aggressively pursue the
prosecution of international financial crimes.197  The Supreme Court
has asserted the government’s interest “in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”198  This has
provided prosecutors with great power.  Thus, even if investigations
do not lead to formal charges, the investigations can still ruin the de-
fendant’s life and reputation.199
White collar investigations now span the globe and as a result the
DOJ continues to work aggressively to investigate and prosecute crim-
inal fraud in the financial market, at home and abroad.200  Thus, it is
not surprising that the DOJ’s Antitrust Division has stated it is com-
mitted to ensuring culpable foreign nationals face the consequences
for violating United States laws.201  Additionally, the imposition of un-
precedented fines against foreign firms and jail sentences against for-
eign nationals sends a powerful message to potential violators that the
United States is committed to vigorous antitrust enforcement, regard-
less of where the participants are located.202
195. Id.
196. Chomski, supra note 11, at 460.
197. Lovells, supra note 124. R
198. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
199. Balko, supra note 127. R
200. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, JUSTICE NEWS (2016), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/global-head-hsbc-s-foreign-exchange-cash-trading-desks-arrested-orchestrat
ing-multimillion
201. Criminal Program Update 2015, supra note 131 (“Last year, the Division secured the first R
ever extradition on an antitrust charge.”).  DOJ investigations have led to the conviction of
American, Swiss, German, Canadian, and Japanese firms—including a number of top executives
who have served jail sentences. Id.
202. Briggerman, supra note 136; Criminal Program Update 2015, supra note 131. R
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The DOJ has prioritized forming strong alliances with its interna-
tional enforcement partners to combat cross-border financial crime.203
The alliances are prioritized because “[t]here are huge ripple effects
that stem from a white collar crime, such as job loss, stock price drops,
consumer price increases, court costs, and jail time after conviction,
never mind the actual cost of the crime itself.”204  The unclear due
process standard “presents a concerning jurisprudential gap—espe-
cially as the [DOJ] increases the number and scope” of white collar
prosecutions across borders.205  The United States is pushing for legis-
lation to protect our nation and its markets—but at what cost?206
While adopting the “minimum contacts” standard would not be a
sizeable change, it would require courts to consider well-developed
Supreme Court precedent to clear up any inconsistencies.207  A “mini-
mum contacts” test for extraterritorial conduct would introduce a flex-
ible standard that comports with due process.208  Prosecution of
foreign defendants without substantial connection and sufficient con-
tacts to the United States should be viewed as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.
IV. IMPACT: THE COST OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME AND
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIMINISHING
DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES
Our society is constantly changing and the standards courts use to
safeguard constitutional principles should change as well.  Advance-
ments in technology continue to shrink the world, which has drasti-
cally changed how we think about personal jurisdiction.209  Just as
interstate travel and communications between corporations forged the
way for the “minimum contacts” test in International Shoe, the in-
crease of global financial markets can provide an opportunity to clar-
ify what is sufficient to exercise jurisdiction over white-collar foreign
defendants.  Equally important is the need to put defendants on no-
tice before they can be prosecuted.  This Part discusses the effects of
prosecuting foreign defendants who have little or no connections to
the United States and the impact this can have on firmly established
constitutional rights.
203. Caldwell, supra note 125. R
204. Graham, supra note 15, at 2–3. R
205. Chomski, supra note 11, at 451.
206. Policing the Net, CBS NEWS (Nov. 22, 2001, 9:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
policing-the-net/
207. Chomski, supra note 11, at 459. R
208. Id.
209. Swedlow, supra note 1, at 347. R
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Foreign nationals are entitled to the same safeguards of the Consti-
tution as U.S. citizens including the guarantee not to be deprived of
their “rights of person and of property.”210  Accordingly, “the overrid-
ing factor in determining whether jurisdiction attaches should be fair-
ness to the defendant.”211  The more the defendant is aware that
criminal conduct will reach the United States, the greater the argu-
ment that personal jurisdiction is reasonable.212  The concept of per-
sonal jurisdiction is static; it must be examined against a backdrop of
changing societal and technological advances.213  “Any court not rec-
ognizing or responding to the imperatively evolutionary nature of . . .
personal jurisdiction” in an increasingly-connected world “runs the
risk of applying outdated standards and imposing injustice.”214  In civil
cases, it is settled law that foreign defendants may appear through
counsel and contest personal jurisdiction.215  However, according to
decisions from the seven circuits that have considered the issue, “the
only way a foreign defendant can assert their the Fifth Amendment
rights is by voluntarily traveling to the United States and submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of a federal court.”216  The result is that
foreign actors are often wrongfully subjected to the jurisdiction of the
United States.217
This injustice is at its pinnacle when foreign defendants are prose-
cuted for financial crimes that have no connection to the United
States.  As shown in Hayes, a defendant’s only option is to travel to
the United States and subject himself to United States federal jurisdic-
tion.218  This outcome is undeniably unfair because the defendant’s
argument is that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from
forcing him to appear in court.219  When foreign defendants are
deemed fugitives and courts are unwilling to apply appropriate due
process standards, there is no check on the government’s decision to
extend United States criminal law into the international field.220  This
result undermines the protections afforded by the Due Process
210. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893).
211. Nicol, supra note 71, at 359 (quoting David C. Tunick, Up Close and Personal: A Close-
Up at Personal Jurisdiction, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1232 (1996)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 313.
214. Id.
215. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 110, at 22 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de R
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412, 418–19 (1984)).
216. Id. at 23.
217. See id. at 9.
218. Id. at 4–5.
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987)).
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Clause.221  The diminishment of these due process principles means
both citizens and noncitizens will lose important constitutional rights.
If the government can charge a certain defendant with only tangential
ties to the United States, it can “sweep up foreign nationals anywhere
in the world based on nothing more than a claim that the U.S. is
among the nations affected.”222  Plainly, the Constitution does not
permit this extension of United States law to financial activity that
occurs overseas.223
Although it is impossible to calculate the total cost of white collar
crimes and its effects, their impact on business and society warrant a
more proportional resource allocation in the future.224  When a com-
pany closes due to white collar prosecution, employees lose jobs, in-
vestors lose money, and customers are penalized.225  However,
securities crimes are an international problem and the DOJ is at-
tempting to solve this problem by “prosecuting complex, international
cases with difficult legal issues.”226  But the DOJ’s focus on securities
crime has resulted in it taking on the role as the world’s police
force.227  In this context, the risk of prosecutorial overreach is too
great.  Prosecutors often prosecute crimes involving minimal domestic
conduct or effect.228   While it is important to combat the disastrous
effects of international white collar crime, the United States govern-
ment must do so while obeying the constitution.
This circuit split erodes the fundamental procedural fairness derived
from the Due Process Clause.  Prosecutors should not be allowed to
rely on a theory of worldwide reliance for establishing jurisdiction
over foreign defendants, especially in the financial context.  World-
wide reliance is an insufficient connection to the United States and
cannot provide the basis for personal jurisdiction.  Foreign defendants
must have “minimum contacts” with the United States before they
can be brought into a U.S. court.
221. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 110, at 34. R
222. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Roger Darin’s Motion, supra note 165, at R
Part IV.
223. Id.
224. Graham supra note 15, at 3. R
225. Id. at 2.  The U.S. government has a hard time measuring the total cost of white collar
crime, thus, the numbers measuring white collar crime fall all over the map, from $44 billion per
year to $600 billion. Id. at 11.
226. Caldwell, supra note 125. R
227. Id. (quoting Karen J. Greenberg, Director, Ctr. on Nat’l Security, Fordham University
School of Law).
228. Lovells, supra note 124. R
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V. CONCLUSION
The prosecution of foreign defendants that lack sufficient contacts
with the United States directly conflicts with the protections afforded
by the Due Process Clause.  These constitutional rights are fundamen-
tal entitlements that cannot be jeopardized no matter where the de-
fendant resides.  Circuit courts have disagreed on the appropriate due
process standard to apply to foreign defendants in the criminal con-
text.  Neither the “sufficient nexus” standard nor the “neither arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair” standard should be sufficient to
prosecute a foreign defendant when his conduct was not aimed at the
United States.  Because greater due process protection is required in
the criminal context, U.S. prosecutors should not be able to rely on
worldwide reliance to compel a foreign defendant to defend himself in
a U.S. court for committing a financial crime.  To comport with due
process the defendant must aim or intend to aim his conduct at the
United States in order to justify an assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion.229  Uncertainty within lowers courts will continue to result in for-
eign defendants being unjustly compelled to defend themselves in
U.S. courts.
To comport with fair play and substantial justice, a foreign defen-
dant cannot be subjected to United States court’s jurisdiction solely
because his conduct was aimed at the world in general.  The potential
for prosecutorial overreach is severe when there is no check on the
United States government’s decision to overextend criminal laws.  A
“minimum contacts” test should be applied in the criminal context for
foreign defendants to comply with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause.
Kayla Foley
229. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Roger Darin’s Motion, supra note 165. R
